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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Janet Heath (Heath), sued Respondents, Angela Palmer (Palmer) and Taylor
Real Estate (Taylor) (collectively Realtors), for alleged breaches of duties owed to her as their
client or as their customer that resulted in Heath purchasing a home that did not provide her the
driveway access Realtors had told her would be provided. The district court dismissed all of
Heath's claims on summary judgment, placing the burden on Heath, as the "customer" or
"client" as those terms are defined in The Idaho Real Estate Brokerage Representation Act,
Idaho Code§ 54-2081 et seq., to catch the realtor's mistakes and misrepresentations relating to
the nature of the driveway access that she would be purchasing. This appeal challenges that and
other rulings of the district court dismissing Health's claims.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case originated when, on June 13, 2018, Walter and William Wallace (Wallaces)
filed a Petition for Quiet Title and Joint Protection Order and Preliminary Injunction against the
Heath regarding a dispute over a joint driveway on property that Heath purchased on January 19,
2018. R. Vol. I, pp. 12-28. On July 23, 2018, Heath filed an Answer and Counterclaim and Jury
Demand on all issues triable by a jury. R. Vol. I, pp. 29--40.
On March 5, 2019, Palmer had been deposed, Heath filed a Third-Party Complaint
against Palmer and Taylor, her broker. R. Vol. I, pp. 151-162. Heath's Third-Party Complaint
alleged two causes of action against Realtors -

negligence and breach of contract. R. Vol. I, pp.
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159-160. Realtors answered Heath's Third-Party Complaint on March 4, 2018. R. Vol. I, pp.
164-169.
On April 23, 2019, Heath moved for partial summary judgment against Realtors, arguing
that: (a) no disputed material facts existed as to whether Realtors violated their duties to Heath as
either a "client" under IC § 54-2087 or as a "customer" under IC § 54-2086; (b) Realtors should
be required to indemnify Heath against the W allaces' claims; and (c) that Realtors should be
liable for damages for Heath's reliance interests caused by breach of their duties. R.Vol. I,
284-289. Heath's motion was supported by Heath's Declaration and the Declaration of Nathan
Olsen, which attached the deposition transcript of Palmer and other admissions made by Palmer
by e-mail. R. Vol. I, pp. 191-270.
On May 9, 2019, Realtors responded to Heath's motion for partial summary judgment
and moved for partial summary judgment of its own. Realtors argued that Heath's breach of
contract and indemnity claims should be dismissed. R. Vol. I, p. 295. Realtors' response
covered their arguments against Heath's motion for partial summary judgment as well as their
own motion for partial summary judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 294-309. Realtors did not move to
dismiss Heath's negligence claims. R. Vol. I, p. 295. See also R. Vol. I, p. 384 (wherein Realtors
state in their reply brief "it must be noted the defendant's (sic) motion for partial summary
judgment did not challenge the negligence claims.") Realtors' summary judgment was
supported by the Declaration of Angela Palmer and Declaration of Jed Taylor. R. Vol. I, pp.
310-350.
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On June 10, 2019, Heath filed her response to the Realtors' Motion for partial summary
judgment, supported by an additional declaration from Heath. R. Vol. I, pp. 362-378. Realtors
filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment on June 17, 2019.
R. Vol. I, pp. 379-93. Heath filed a reply in support of her motion on June 17, 2019. R. Vol. I,
pp. 394-398. A hearing was held on June 24, 2019, on the respective motions for partial
summary judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 8.
On August 20, 2019, the district court issued its Order Denying Third-Party Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 400-415. The order, which dismissed Heath's entire case against the
Realtors including the negligence claims, failed to address most of the issues raised by both
parties in their respective motions for summary judgment. Instead, the district court concluded
that "1. Heath has not raised a material issue of fact with regard to breach of statutory duty by
Palmer. 2. Heath has not raised a material issue of fact with regard indemnification (sic) by
Taylor/Palmer of any liability Heath may incur in this lawsuit. 3. Heath has not raised a
material issue of fact with regard to common law foreseeable damages." R. Vol. I, p. 415.
The district court issued judgment on August 28, 2019, which it certified as final under
IRCP § 54(b). R. Vol. I, pp. 417--418.
Heath filed a Notice of Appeal on October 10, 2019, after which all other pending
matters, including the trial set for Wallaces' petition and Heath's counterclaims, were stayed
pending the outcome of this appeal. R. Vol. pp. 11, 420-22.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 20, 2017, Heath texted Palmer informing her that Heath wanted to buy a
house and asking Palmer if she could "be my realtor." Palmer's response was "Abso-freakin'lutely my cousin!" R. Vol. I, pp. 363, 366. In the hours and days that followed, Palmer sent
Heath numerous communications both by text and e-mail, including listings and attempts to set
Heath up with a lender. In each of Palmer's e-mails, Palmer signed her name and indicated she
was with "Taylor Real Estate." R. Vol. I, p. 363.
On November 24, 2017, Heath and Palmer met to look at several of the listed properties,
including the property that Heath eventually purchased which is the subject matter of this case,
owned by Donald and Marilyn Ciccone (Property). R. Vol. I, p. 363. Palmer had shown the
Property to at least one other prospective buyer and had toured the Property with other realtors
when it was initially listed for sale. R. Vol. I, p. 11 (Palmer Dep. pp.11:13-25; 12; 13:1-13.)
Based upon her observations, Palmer noticed that that a joint driveway existed between
the Property and the property next door owned by Walter and Wilma Wallace (Wallace
Property), and that without a joint driveway, there would be either no or at least limited access to
the Property. R. Vol. I, pp. 199-201 (Palmer Dep. pp. 17:4-24; 21; 22:1-20.) Palmer also
observed that the joint driveway existed all the way up to the houses of the two properties. R.
Vol. I, pp. 202,208 (Palmer Dep. pp. 28:9-25; 51:13-25.)
Palmer obtained copies of the Seller's Property Disclosure for the Property and the
recorded 1998 Driveway Agreement, which indicated that the joint driveway was 21 feet wide
and a distance of 127 feet from the highway. R. Vol. pp. 206-07 (Palmer Dep. pp. 42:8-18;
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43-44; 45:1-7.) Palmer sent the 1998 Driveway Agreement to Heath on December 6, 2017. Id.
R. Vol. I, pp. 43 (Palmer Dep. p. 43:2-25), 258-260, 363. Palmer admitted that, without a joint
driveway easement of this width and distance, the limitations of access to the Property would
make the property of substantially less value and unmarketable. R. Vol. I, p. 87 (Palmer Dep. p.
22:2-20.) Palmer also admitted that the need for a shared driveway for adequate access to the
Property would need to be brought to the attention of prospective buyers. Id.
Heath entered into a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (REPC) prepared by
Palmer for the Property. Palmer had advised Heath that the 1998 Joint Driveway Agreement was
a permanent easement and/or part of the purchase. Heath Dec.
set to close on January 19, 2018. Heath Dec.

,r 3. The sale of the Propertywas

,r 4.

At no point during any of their initial communications or during their meetings thereafter
up and until the signing of the REPC did Palmer provide to Heath the "Agency Disclosure
Brochure" referred to her in her declaration. R. Vol. pp. 363, 316-317. Instead, this document
was sent to Heath electronically to sign along with the REPC and numerous other documents,
without any explanation. Id. The REPC lists the Realtors as the "responsible broker," "working
with buyer," and "acting as a nonagent." R. Vol. I, pp. 319,324. However, IC§ 54-2085(1)
required the Realtors to provide Heath as a prospective buyer the "agency disclosure brochure
... at the first substantial business contact." Realtors did not comply, and therefore were in
violation of real estate licensure law. Id. § (5).
On January 9, 2018, Ms. Palmer sent the following e-mail to Heath:
I found out that the driveway agreement that was in place that
I sent you previously was just between the neighbor and the seller.
8
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had seller work with title to create an agreement like we have for the well so
that it moves forward with the next buyers on the property. That way it'll make
it easier for you to sell and you won't have to work through that when you sell
the property :-) we will be signing this at closing. Just wanted to give you a
copy of it for your record.
Angela Palmer
Associate Broker/REAL TOR
Taylor Real Estate
R. Vol. I, p. 339.
Attached to the e-mail is an unsigned draft of driveway agreement between the sellers of
the Property and the Wallaces (2018 Driveway Agreement). R. Vol. I, p. 339. On January 10,
2018, Heath responded by e-mail with "Thank you!" R. Vol. I, p. 339.
Wallace testified that in "January 2018, (he) received a phone call from Angela Palmer of
Taylor Real Estate" that Heath was trying to purchase the Property and that Heath "would not do
so without a driveway agreement and a well usage agreement." R. Vol. I, p. 57. Palmer was also
the point of contact for the title and closing agency, which advised Palmer that the "neighbors"
(Wallaces) had signed the agreement at that the "Cicconnes" (sellers) would "sign at closing."
R. Vol. I, p. 341.
Heath did not read the attachment because she accepted Ms. Palmer's explanation that
the agreement would simply "move forward" the 1998 Driveway Agreement to the next owner.
R. Vol. I, 363-64. Additionally, Palmer did not instruct Heath to review or read the document,
but rather told Heath that she was "just" giving Heath a "copy for her records." Id.
Palmer did not read or review the 2018 Driveway Agreement herself prior to sending the
e-mail to Heath or prior to closing. R. Vol. I, p. 208 (Palmer Dep., p. 50: 13-15.) In actuality, the
9

2018 Driveway Agreement substantially shortened the driveway easement from what existed in
the 1998 Driveway Agreement, reducing the length from 127 feet to 43 feet. R. Vol. I, pp. 208,
pp. 250-252. (Palmer Dep. p. 51: 1-12, Ex. 7) Additionally, because the Wallaces' property line
is a mere 11 feet 4 inches from the garages on the Property, it is virtually impossible to use the
garages for vehicles without crossing over the property line. R. Vol. p. 268.
Palmer did not advise Heath of these material changes in the configuration of the
easement prior to the closing on the Property. Id. Had Heath been informed of the changes being
made to the shared driveway, which effectively cut off access to her garages, she would have not
purchased the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 268-269.
The Property was purchased and deeded to Heath on January 19, 2018. R. Vol. p. 272.
On the morning of January 19, 2018, Heath arrived at the offices of Alliance Title with Palmer to
sign the documents necessary to close the sale. R. Vol. p. 208 (Palmer Dep., p. 53.) The Sellers
came in to sign their documents thereafter. Id. The 2018 Joint Driveway Agreement with the
material changes was recorded by Alliance Title on January 19, 2018, at approximately 1:56
p.m. R. Vol. I, p. 250. Palmer and Taylor received their commission for the sale of the Property
to Heath. R. Vol. I, p. 244.
On June 12, 2018, Wallaces filed their petition for declaratory relief and quiet title
seeking to enforce the 2018 Joint Driveway Agreement and allowing them to construct a fence
on the property line, effectively cutting off access by Heath to her property via the driveway. R.
Vol. I, pp. 12-28. Heath counterclaimed that the 1998 Joint Driveway Agreement constitutes an
enforceable and permanent easement. R. Vol. 1-11, 29--40. This has resulted in a long and
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protracted litigation between the Wallaces and Heath, which has yet to be fully decided and is
pending this appeal. R. Vol 1-11.
Heath has incurred a substantial amount of actual costs, damages and harm from
Wallaces' attempts to enforce the 2018 Joint Driveway Agreement. R. Vol I., p. 269. If the
district court determines that no apparent easement exists for the use of the joint driveway, then
Heath's access to the use of her garages will be virtually cut off, as well as most of the existing
driveway as it comes closer to her house. Id. The value of her property will be substantially
reduced, if not made completely unmarketable. Heath Dec. Id.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Heath's claims against Realtors arising from
Realtors' breach of statutory duties to Heath as their "customer" under IC § 54-2086?
2. Did the district court err in dismissing Heath's claims against Realtors for arising
from Realtors' breach of statutory duties to Heath as their "client" under IC § 54-2087?
3. Did the district court err in dismissing Heath's remedies of indemnification and
reliance costs incurred by Heath because of Realtors' breach of their statutory duties?

ARGUMENT
I. The Standard of Review is De Novo
As stated by this Court:
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the
11

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the
non-moving party. However, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.

Path To Health, LLP v. Long, 383 P.3d 1220,1224 (2016)(citations omitted).

II.

Materially Disputed Facts Exist as to Whether the Realtors Violated Duties to their
Customer Under IC§ 54-2086.
It is not disputed that Heath was at the very least a "customer" of both Palmer and

Taylor, and that Realtors were therefore bound to the duties set forth under IC§ 54-2086. See the
REPC at R. Vol. I, pp. 319,324. Although the REPC identifies Palmer and Taylor as
"nonagents" under the "Representation Confirmation," the term "nonagents" does not have the
same definition or interpretation of the same term under common law. Rather, Idaho law has
set out the duties of a realtor acting as a nonagent under IC § 54-2086.
Additionally, as the "broker" Taylor has responsibility and therefore liability for the
actions of Palmer as an agent in his brokerage. The REPC lists Taylor as the "responsible
broker." See R. Vol. I, p. 319. Under IC§ 54-2038, "the designated broker"
is responsible for the actions of its licensees and associated unlicensed persons
performed within the course and scope of their employment or agency, regardless
of the location of the company's business or where representation is conducted.
(1) A designated broker is required to:
(a) Supervise and control, in the manner required by law and rule, all office locations,
and the activities of all licensees and unlicensed persons associated with that
brokerage company or for whom that designated broker is responsible;
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(b) Review and approve all real estate agreements including, but not limited to,
those related to listing, selling or purchasing property and brokerage
representation agreements;

Id.
This Court in Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016),
acknowledged liability to a licensed realtor under IC § 54-2086, noting that:
Idaho Code section 54-2086 establishes the duties owed to a customer who "is not
represented by a brokerage in a regulated real estate transaction .... " Among those duties
is the requirement to disclose "all adverse material facts actually known or which
reasonably should have been known .... " I.C. § 54-2086(1)(d). The duties imposed by
both statutes "are mandatory and may not be waived or abrogated, either unilaterally or
by agreement." I.C. § § 54-2086(3); 54-2087(8).

Id.
This Court further indicated that neither IC § 54-2087 nor § 2086
give[ s] a brokerage and its agents license to mislead clients by providing false
information. To hold otherwise would be to eviscerate the statutory duties to exercise
reasonable skill and care and disclose adverse material facts. Thus, we hold that Idaho
Code sections 54-2086 and 54-2087 do not eliminate the duty not to make
misrepresentations of material fact.

Id.
In this case, the Realtors even acknowledged that there were at least disputed facts as to
whether the Realtors violated their duties to Heath as their "customer." In fact, Realtors
specifically indicated to the district court that their "partial motion for summary judgment" did

not address Heath's "negligence" claims based upon IC § 54-2086. Regardless, the district court
inexplicably decided that the Realtors were not negligent, even under the strict burden imposed
on Realtors in a summary judgment proceeding. In so doing, the district court virtually ignored
facts that raised at the very least material issues of fact as to whether the Realtors violated a
number of duties they owed to Heath as their customer.
13

Section 54-2086 (b) and (d) requires the Realtors to perform these acts with honesty,
good faith, reasonable skill and care, and to disclose to the customer all adverse material facts
actually known or which reasonably should have been known by the Realtors. The Realtors
violations of those duties began at the very outset of their relationship with Heath, and became
progressively worse.
First, Realtors did not promptly inform Heath of the nature of their relationship with her,
as required by law. If their intention was to act as a "nonagent" to Heath, making her a
"customer" rather than a "client," that fact should have been disclosed up front to Heath. Instead,
in every respect the Realtors both represented to Heath that they were acting as her agent, with
her best interests in mind, and in fact attempted to act as such. By attempting to slip the agency
brochure into the mix several days after the relationship started, without any explanation, when
they then continued to act (or to pretend to act) as her agent after the purchase offer was signed
does not in any way absolve Realtors of their responsibility and obligations not to mislead or
deal in good faith with their "customer."
It should be noted that the brochure itself does not establish any agreement or right, but

rather is a required disclosure that must be made "at the first substantial business contact." That
was not done. Instead, when Heath's first contacted Palmer and requested that Palmer be her
realtor, Palmer responded affirmatively with "abso-freakin' -lutely" and subsequently acted and
represented that she was in fact Heath's agent and had her best interests in mind throughout the
entire transaction. Clearly, Realtors mislead Heath throughout the entire process and afterward
as to the nature of their relationship and responsibilities to her.
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Second and more critically, Realtors violated their obligations to Heath even as a
"customer" by failing to disclose adverse material facts that were known or should have been
known, and by failing to exercise reasonable skill and care with regard to the 2018 Joint
Driveway Agreement. Palmer, knowing that the driveway was essential to the value of the
property, failed to even read the document before representing that it simply "passed on" the
rights established for the sellers in the 1998 Joint Driveway Agreement. Had she read the
agreement, she would have seen that it purported to eliminate two-thirds of the length of the
shared driveway and thus would virtually cut off access to the Property's garage. Whether she
should have read that document or mentioned the changes in that document from the 1998 Joint
Driveway Agreement is at least a material issue of fact as to whether those duties were breached.
Third, Palmer (acting for Taylor) took the obligation upon herself to have an agreement
drafted to assure that Heath's shared driveway rights would be protected. The agreement that
was drafted at her request did not actually do that, but substantially eliminated most of the
benefit of that shared driveway. Thus, Palmer actually caused the damage by having an
agreement drafted that did not do what she said it was intended to do.
Finally, without reading or reviewing that faulty agreement, Palmer sent an unsigned
copy to Heath, misrepresenting what it did, and did not even encourage or urge her to read or
review the draft agreement. Instead, she merely stated that she is "just" giving Heath "a copy for
her records."
The district court's decision attempts to explain away or excuse the Realtors' actions, not
only by construing the facts in most favorable light to the moving party (the Realtors), but also
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by disregarding facts not favorable to the Realtors. Because of this approach, the district court
effectively usurped the role of the jury in weighing the evidence, deciding that the Realtors
violated no duties. This ruling came despite uncontradicted evidence provided by Heath that
Palmer had misled Heath about the nature of the representation, that Palmer had not read or
reviewed the 2018 Driveway Agreement, or that Palmer misrepresented to Heath that the 2018
Driveway Agreement simply "passed on" the benefits of the 1998 agreement to Heath when it
clearly did just the opposite, taking most of those benefits away. See R. Vol. I, pp. 412--413. In
essence, the district court essentially held that Heath should have not trusted or relied upon
Palmer's representations and, despite her lack of expertise in real estate matters compared to
Palmer, caught Palmer's errors. Id.
This is exactly the kind of excuse for avoiding liability that this Court frowned upon
when it reversed the district court's summary decision in Path to Health. Path To Health, 383
P.3d at 1229. In Path to Health, the district court had granted the realtor's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the customer/client should have checked the zoning of the property rather
than rely upon the realtor's representations that the property was zoned for commercial use
(when it was not). Id. This Court rejected this notion by finding that "a reasonable finder of fact
could conclude that a layperson may justifiably rely on multiple assurances from a realtor as to
the zoning status of property." Id.
The same is true in this case. The finder of fact could determine that Heath "justifiably
relied" upon Palmer's representation that the 2018 Driveway Agreement "moved forward" the
previous driveway agreement so that it would be "easier for you to sell and you won't have to
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work through that when you sell the property." R. Vol p. 339. The trier of fact could also find
that Heath reasonably relied upon Palmer's implied representation that the copy did what she
said it did, that it was just a formality to give her a copy for her file, and that reading it would not
be necessary since the draft just keeps the current driveway "in place." And a reasonable jury
could find that Palmer both violated her statutory duty to exercise reasonable skill and care by
failing to read or review the document before sending it to Heath, but also by misleading Heath
into believing that Palmer had actually read and reviewed the document (the only way she could
honestly represent that the draft merely "moved forward" existing joint driveway rights).
Thus, the district court erred by finding that there was no disputed fact as to whether
Palmer and ostensibly her broker Taylor violated their duties.
In its ruling, the district court's reliance upon Irwin Rogers Insurance Agency, Inc. v.

Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 273, 833 P.2d 128, 132 (Ct. App. 1992) was misplaced. The district
court states that this decision stands for the "well established proposition that "a party's failure
to read a contract will not excuse that party's performance on that contract." R. Vol. I, p. 413.
While that proposition may be well-established, it simply does not apply to this case. Heath was

not a party to the 2018 Driveway Agreement. Rather, that agreement-which was notsigned
until after Heath signed the closing documents designated for her signature -

was between the

seller of the Property and the W allaces. There is no duty under the law for a person to read and
review contracts between other parties, and Murphy does not purport to hold that such a duty
exists.
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Finally, the fact that the 1998 Driveway Agreement was between the seller and another
party exposes yet another breach of the Realtors duty to Heath as a customer. The only way that
Realtors could assure Heath that the pre-existing driveway agreement was "passed on" to her
would have been if the new agreement was between Heath as the buyer of the Property and the
neighbor, the Wallaces. Whether that should have been the focus of the agreement is at the very
least another disputed issue of material fact that would preclude granting summary judgment to
the Realtors.

III.

Materially Disputed Facts Exist as to Whether the Realtors Violated Duties to their
Client for Duties they Incurred Under IC§ 54-2087.
Many of the same duties that the Realtors allegedly violated under IC § 54-2086 with

regard to a "customer" are the same as duties that Realtors owed to their "client" under IC § 542087. This includes duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, as well the duty to disclose
material facts. In addition, there are at least disputed facts in this case that suggest that the
Realtors agreed to take on responsibilities or duties to Heath as a "client," particularly pertaining
to what appears to be their agreement or their written representation that they would facilitate the
drafting of the 2018 Driveway Agreement" as compared or contrasted to the "written
representation agreement" or an obligation that was "reduced to writing."
Under IC § 54-2087, a licensed realtor owes certain duties to a "client" upon "a written
contract for representation in a regulated real estate transaction." As defined in that statute: "a
'Representation agreement' or a 'contract for representation' means: "a written agreement
between a buyer, seller, or both, and a real estate brokerage for agency representation in a
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regulated real estate transaction. A representation agreement under this chapter can only be made
in writing, and cannot be made orally or by assumption or implication." IC § 54-2083(15). It is
important to note that there is no specific form set forth under the statute for a representation
agreement, but only that the agreement be in writing and not made by "assumption" or
"implication."
In this case, the Realtors entered into a written contract with Heath to assist her in a key
component of the real estate transaction when they agreed in writing via a January 9, 2018, email to have the "sellers and title [company] (sic) create an agreement" for the shared driveway
to ensure that it "passed on" to Heath when the property was sold. R. Vol. I, p. 339. Palmer
clearly facilitated the drafting and execution of this new driveway agreement, which occurred

after execution of the REPC by Heath. Palmer approached the Wallaces about drafting the
agreement and acted as the point person on behalf of Heath with the title company and closing
agency regarding the driveway agreement. See R. Vol. I, p. 341. Without question, the 2018
Driveway Agreement would have never been drafted or executed without Palmer's initiative,
direction, and involvement. Heath acknowledged Palmer's agreement to take on this
responsibility or obligation in a follow-up e-mail. R. Vol. I, p. 339.
This January 12, 2018, e-mail exchange between Palmer and Heath meets the basic
requirement of a written agreement. The agreement is not made by "assumption" or
"implication" because Palmer states with specificity that she (Palmer) "had the sellers work with
title" to "create" the document. In other words, Palmer as realtor and agent for the broker and on
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Heath's behalf initiated and took responsibility for the drafting of an agreement that was to be
part of the real estate transaction, to be "signed at closing." Id.
Even if the Court were to find that that the e-mail exchange did not constitute a written
representation agreement, without question, certain other obligations taken on by the Realtors
were "reduced to writing," the failure of which makes them liable. Under IC § 54-2087(7)
"Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to a client to
conduct an independent inspection of the property and owe no duty to independently verify the
accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation made regarding a property." Id.
(emphasis added.) In this case, the Realtors agreed "in writing" to pursue a joint driveway
agreement that would ensure that the existing driveway agreement would "pass on" to Heath as
part of the sale of the property. Having made such a commitment in writing, the Realtors were
bound by the obligation to "perform the written agreement," i.e. in this case to ensure that the
driveway agreement they caused to have drafted would in fact have "passed on" the 1998 Shared
Driveway Agreement to Heath. Additionally, the Realtors made further assurances that the
drafted agreement would make the property "easier to sell" for Heath in the future. R. Vol. I, p.
339. However, the Realtors violated their agreement with Heath by having drafted an agreement
that did not "pass on" the 1998 Joint Driveway Agreement, but instead had the opposite effectpotentially restricting the use of the driveway and making it extremely difficult if not impossible
for Heath to sell the property in the future.
All of these arguments were made to the district court in Heath's response to the
Realtors' motion for summary judgment, but none were addressed by the district court. The

20

district court was simply fixated on the notion that, notwithstanding any representations or
written obligations taken on by the Realtors, Heath should have ignored or disregarded those
representations and acted like they didn't have an expert representing them. R. Vol. I, pp.
411--412. All of these notions involve disputed facts that should be determined by the jury as the
trier of fact, not by the district court.

IV.

Realtors' Duties Under Statute Are Incorporated by their Contract with Heath
Either as a Customer or a Client.
A question that was effectively sidestepped and not addressed by the district court is

whether, under the authority established by this Court in Path to Health, duties under both IC§
54-2087 and§ 54-2086 are incorporated into an agreement between the realtors and their
customer/clients. Undoubtedly, Realtors will raise this question again in the event that this Court
remands the case, and it may be prudent to address this issue now.
In Path to Health this Court held that it is "axiomatic that extant law is written into and

made a part of every written contract. Existing law becomes part of a contract, just as though the
contract contains an express provision to that effect, unless a contrary intent is disclosed." Path

To Health, LLP v. Long, 383 P.3d at 1227 (citations omitted). This common-sense approach
taken by this Court should apply to this case, regardless of whether Heath was considered a
"client" or a "customer."
In this case, there was at the very least written agreement between Heath and the Realtors

as a "customer," i.e., the REPC. R. Vol. I, pp. 319,324. The term "nonagent" is somewhat
misleading, since under a common law interpretation the term would suggest that the "nonagent"
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has no duty or obligation to the "non-principal." However, Idaho statute does create and
recognize a duty of a realtor to a "customer" even though under the statute titles the realtor is
acting as a "nonagent." The REPC itself identifies the "nonagent" as "working with" the buyer
and "acting" as a "nonagent." Thus, even where the realtor is listed as a "nonagent," he or she
still has the duty and obligations to the customer set forth in the statute, as identified by law
referenced in the written agreement.
Under the clear and "axiomatic" authority recognized by this Court in Path to Health,
such "existing law" becomes "part of the contract" between the realtor and the customer under
the written REPC disclosing that law. Simply put, this Court can and should clarify its holding in
Path to Health to include the duties under IC§ 50-2086 to be incorporated into the REPC in the

same way that IC § 50-2087 does in a Buyer Representation Agreement. Interpreting it any
other way would be nonsensical and contrary to basic principles of law and fairness.

V.

Heath Can Pursue Indemnification and Reliance Costs as a Remedy to Realtors'
Breach of Duty.
The district court granted the Realtor's motion for summary judgment dismissing Heath's

claim for remedies such as indemnification and reliance costs. R. Vol. I, pp. 413-414. It is
somewhat odd that the district court ruled on these claims, where it had already dismissed
Heath's claims for liability making a ruling on possible remedies unnecessary. Nevertheless,
the district court's reasoning on "dismissing" these remedies was not accurately based on any
existing law or authority.
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The district court based its decision to dismiss what it deemed as "common law
contractual damages," including indemnification and the "theory of common law reliance
damages," as not being an available remedy under the Idaho Real Estate Brokerage
Representation Act (IREBRA)(IC §§ 54-2082 et seq.) which, as suggested by the district court,
has "supplanted" such remedies. R. Vol. I, pp. 413--414. The district court is simply incorrect.
There is absolutely no provision in the IREBRA which limits remedies that are available
to a plaintiff for a realtor's breach of contract or other breach of duty as defined under the Act.
The IREBRA does contain a provision that limits a realtor and broker's "fiduciary'' duties to
those defined in the act, as well as the "equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty." IC §
54-2094. However, this provision in no way restricts any other remedies, i.e., for breach of
contract, negligence, or misrepresentation. The district court cites no authority to support such a
proposition, and in fact does not provide any authority to distinguish the difference between
what it deems a "common law" remedy for breach of contract and a "statutory'' remedy for
breach of contract. There is simply no basis or premise for the district court's ruling on this
point, which should be reversed.
In actuality, Idaho precedent and authority does exist for an indemnification and reliance
remedies for breach duties by a realtor, and which in some cases such as this one is likely the
most appropriate remedy. As has long been recognized in Idaho, equity allows for indemnification under a general theory that one compelled to pay damages caused by another should be able
to seek recovery from that party. May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho
319, 321, 543 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1975). This Court has held that indemnification is appropriate to

23

remedy damages caused by a realtor's violation of duties. Powell v. Nietmann, 116 Idaho 590,
594, 778 P.2d 340, 344 (1989) (upholding a trial court ruling that the realtor was required to
indemnify harms caused by the realtor not properly disclosing certain condition of the property
relating to sewage disposal requirements).
In this case, the lawsuit brought by W allaces is a direct result of the Realtors' failure to

disclose adverse material facts and/or to exercise reasonable skill and care (ensuring that the
purchase included a permanent easement for the entire shared driveway). As such, the Realtors
should be required to cover any damages and costs incurred by Heath as a result of their
negligence. Even if Heath is ultimately able to establish an apparent easement for the shared
driveway, she will have incurred a substantial amount of attorney fees, court costs and other
damages as a result of being deprived of the shared driveway even on a temporary basis. If the
outcome of this action results in Heath not being provided a permanent and transferrable
easement of the shared driveway, then the Realtors should be required to indemnify her from the
loss of value to the property as well, which could in fact be a total loss of value due to the
property.
Heath may also be entitled to damages for her "reliance" upon the Realtors' duties
under the statute, and/or their agreement with Heath either as a "customer" or "client."
Normally damages from a breach of contract is based on the "expectation interest" of the injured
party, as determined by "loss of value" caused by the breach, b) any other incidental or
consequential loss, and c) any other cost or loss avoided by not having to perform. Rest. Of Law,
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2nd Conlr. § 347. See also Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703,705,620 P.2d 276, 278 (1980)
(injured party entitled to damages "foreseeable" at the time of contract).
However, an "alternative" remedy includes "damages based on reliance interest." Rest.

OfLaw, 2nd Conlr. § 349:
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured party has a
right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in
preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach
can prove with reasonable certainty that the injured party would have suffered had
the contract been performed.
In this case, the Realtors owed Heath certain duties either by contract or statute under

the expectation or reliance that the Realtors would disclose adverse material facts and exercise
reasonable skill and care in the performance of their duties. Had the Realtors properly
disclosed to Heath the W allaces' and sellers' intention to enter into an agreement that
shortened the shared driveway to 43 feet from the highway, Heath would have never
completed the purchase of the property. Nor would she have purchased the property without
assurance that the shared driveway as it existed in the 1998 Joint Driveway Agreement would
be a permanent easement that was part and parcel to the property. In other words, had the
Realtors performed their duties, Heath would have completely avoided all of the problems she
now faces with this property, not the least of which is the action filed by Wallaces against her.
Under this damage theory, one option would be to require the Realtors to place Heath
in the position prior to her having purchased the property, to in effect "make her whole." This
would require the Realtors to purchase the property in the amount paid by Heath, and any
other costs and damages associated with the purchase of the property. This may include some
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"offsets" consisting of "benefits" that Heath has received. In fact, this is the exact remedy
accepted by this Court for the realtor's failures in Powell v. Nietmann, 116 Idaho 594-595,
778 P.2d 340, 345-346. Thus, Heath could be entitled to her damages for her reliance interests
in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact.

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, this Court should grant Heath's ppeal and remand the case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2020.

PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN

/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
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